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Taken as a whole, 1993 was a year in which the problems of the 
Croatian economy, caused by the war and the transitional crisis, and 
further aggravated by the impossibility of finding optimal solutions, or by 
an earlier delay of such a solution, culminated in high inflation which 
additionally worsened the overall economic performance both in the real 
and especially in financial and monetary spheres. 
 
Industrial production, which due to the sectoral asymmetry of the war 
depression increased its share in the structure of the social product 
from the prewar 33.2% to 41.9% in 1992, decreased during 1993 by 
5.9%, coming down in such a way to the level of 42.5% lower than in 
1990, or by 50.1 % lower than the highest level achieved in 1987. 
Production decreased in all three main destination groups with the 
largest fall in the group of the eqipment (- 11.9%), where on the 
average it was lower by 55.1 % than before the war with the variation by 
branches ranging from -40.1 % (production of electrical machinery and 
instruments) to -72.9% (machine building). The production level in 
shipbuilding which is traditionally the biggest exporter, decreased in 
1993 by 21.7% In relation to 1990 it is lower by 53.4% with very 
negative implications on the financial situation within the reproductive 
chain and on the operations of regional banks. In the conditions of 
notable disinvestments in the country, where the realized investments 
reached not more than 80% of the amortization (1992), this was 
essentially induced in 1993 by the decline in equipment exports to the 
convertible currency market by 45.6% (decline in relation to 1990 by 
56.8%). As a result this relatively biggest net exporting sector in the 
industry, which even in the war conditions achieved an annual surplus 
of about 170 million dollars (coverage of imports by exports of 139%), 
suffered  in   1993   a  deficit  of  389  million  dollars  with  the  level  of 
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coverage of imports by exports of only 46%. 
 
Such developments in industrial production and the situation in 
investments resulted in a decrease in the transport activity (-8.9%) and 
in construction (-10.4%), which determined an overall fall in the 
economic activity of about 6% in relation to the previous year. Different 
rates of exchange in particular activities dependening on the intensity of 
specific character of individual factors, varied from -28.1 % in retail 
trade to +20.3% in the number of tourist overnights. In this way, the 
general level of economic activity in Croatia was cut by half in relation to 
its prewar amount. 
 
A decline in the economic activity was also accompanied during 1993 
by a decrease in total employment of 4.1 %, with the transitional 
tendency of the increase in the number of employed in the private 
sector (22.1 %) and the decrease in the social sector (-6.3%). Since the 
registered unemployment simultaneously decreased in relation to 1992 
by 4%, the unemployment rate remained unchanged (17.8%) being 
almost twice as big as in the prewar and pretransitional period (9.3%). 
In the same period the labour productivity decreased by 33%. In such a 
way, the economic activity in 1993 proceeded with a relatively low level 
of employment of economically active population and with low labour 
productivity, which means with high gross costs (without regard to the 
fact that the unit net price of labour decreased in relation to the prewar 
by 63%). All this, together with other factors, caused a low price 
competitiveness of the economy both in exports and in the domestic 
market, exerting in this way a constant pressure on the exchange rate 
policy. 
 
However, even in the conditions of the indexed exchange rate, due to 
the decline in the sales on the markets of ex-Yugoslavia by 51.8%, and 
to the increased problems in the marketing on convertible currency 
areas (with the exception of the finishing sector), the exports of goods 
as the essential segment of the aggregate demand decreased in 1993 
by 15.1 %, expanding the problem of production realization to the 
agriculture sector as well (decrease in exports by 33.8%). But  owing  to 
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the relatively good results in tourism and to the corresponding increase 
in the export of services by 19.6% the total exports of goods and 
services dropped by 6.5% in relation to 1992, absorbing about 68.7% of 
the supply from the domestic sources. 
 
At the same time, the import of goods increased by 4.6%. If the import 
of services is taken into account, total imports increased by 6.5%. As a 
result, in 1993 a foreign trade deficit amounted to about US$ 200 mil. It 
was mostly financed by the current transfers from abroad. Despite a fall 
in production in 1993 this made it possible to prevent a decline in goods 
and services available for final consumption in the country. 
 
However, there was no a real income to finance such a volume of 
consumption. Because of the high inflation, the real purchasing power 
of money receipts in the business sector, reduced by the outlays for the 
material expenditures (which category is approximately 95% of the 
social product of the state sector) has been namely decreased by 13.1 
% (from 1992 to 1993) inducing as a consequence (through the 
increase in the average annual tax rates, the "escape" of wages into 
lower brackets of income taxation, and the general tax evasion) a real 
drop in basic categories of the distribution of the social product - in the 
volume of wages and salaries by 19.1 %, taxes (gross) by 10.5%, and, 
through them in the registered effective demand in the domestic market 
by 18.7%. As a consequence, about 14% of the aggregate demand in 
1993 was covered by different forms of deficit financing, i.e., by the 
increase in the internal debt. This also corresponds to the relation 
between money supply increase and the nominal social product (in this 
case: net income of the economy) which amounts to 14.4%, and which 
is usually taken as a measure of the monetization of the budget deficit. 
 
Consequently, money supply was growing during 1993 at an average 
monthly rate of 21 %, and base money (having a real basis in the 
increase in currency reserves of the central bank of 452 million dollars) 
at the rate of 22.0%, making up a monetary basis for high inflation, to 





to October a monthly price growth of 28.6%. That circle: budget deficit - 
monetary expansion - inflation, was a key determining factor of the 
monetary and financial trends in Croatian economy during 1993. Since 
the relations between these categories are not (in the conditions of 
undisturbed flows) dynamically proportionate but progressive, they 
simultaneously resulted in a decrease in the real stock of money (by 
20.9% during 1993, and even by 46% in 1993 over 1992) as well as in 
real income decrease, which caused bigger and bigger problems in 
deficit financing. The situation could not be releived by the fact that the 
current deficit in 1993 (14.4%) was as a matter of fact by 22% smaller 
than in 1992, when under the direct influence of the war it attained 
18.4%, because at the same time the volume of the real money 
(measured by the share of the average money supply in the realized 
social product) decreased from 12.9% to 8.8%, or by 32%. 
 
In October, the Government of the Republic of Croatia decided to 
undertake radical measures of the antiinflationary policy within a scope 
of broader activities for the stabilization of the economy and 
intensification of transitional processes. That was preceded by three 
elements. 
 
The first refers to the acceleration of the inflation at the beginning of the 
autumn to the level higher than 30% monthly, what " broke" the 
syndrome which had been quite present till then in the part of the 
economic and political public, and which represented a thesis that the 
inflation could be reduced even without direct radical antiinflationary 
measures - and, what is even worse - that such measures are not at all 
applicable to the current situation in Croatia. It became namely evident 
that the acceleration of inflation is not just a temporary result of an 
additional accomodation in the movement of its basic determinants, but 
one more in the series of logical consequences of the indexation 
strengthening at a permanently high inflation. Consequently, there could 
be no doubt that the reproduction of that mechanism simply could not 
slow down the inflation - but it could accelerate it to the levels which 
coul not be justified by any economic, political or other reasons. 
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The second element lies in a political evaluation of the appropriate 
moment, in the development of economic and political conditions in the 
country, which would allow: (a) to reduce essentially the financing by 
money emmision of the growth of foreign currency reserves as a 
potential source for defense financing (b) to stabilize the material 
expenses of the state budget and funds, and to eliminate the shock-
components in their structure; and (c) to increase the financial discipline 
in public enterprises and in the enterprises in predominant state 
ownership, especially after the harmonization of relative prices. 
 
Finally, the third element is connected with the fact that at the end of 
September foreign currency reserves reached the amount of 1222 
million dollars, what enabled the approach to the realization of the 
antiinflationary policy even without usual arrangements on international 
financial support. These reserves became sufficient for a three-month 
financing of commodity imports or for almost a two-month financing of 
total expenditures for current transactions with foreign countries, but in 
the first place, combined with the simultaneous decrease in the real 
money balance, they became a key component in the structure of the 
total money supply. 
 
Antiinflationary measures, which were undertaken, belong to the 
standard heterodox shock-therapy , applied already with a relative 
success in individual countries. It implies a direct attach on the 
mechanisms of self-generating inflation (limitation of base money and, 
depending on that, determination of the discount rate and the 
intervention exchange rate of national currency), and then, within a 
priori restricted monetary framework, introduction of the instruments of 
the control of incomes, in order to distribute evenly the effects of 
monetary restriction. 
 
The beginning of the application of the program with a delay of one 
month, orientation on the dynamic instead of static fixing of the anchors, 
the avoidance of an absolute limitation of the public sector 
expenditures, and a prompt integration and consolidation of the total 
budget, lowering  of  the  discount  rate  to only 3%, as well as refraining 
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from some other measures which often help the realization of a radical 
antiinflationary policy, were only " little concessions " which temporally 
dispersed the effects of the shock - therapy but which didn't change its 
basic character. 
 
The effects of the antiinflationary policy measures quickly contributed to 
the realization of its primary objectives. After a jump in retail prices in 
October in relation to September by 38.7% - which was expected as a 
result of the prompt exchange rate depreciation at the start of the 
program - market decrease in the effective exchange rate, lowering of 
sales tax rates, reducing interest rates by prohibitive taxation, limitation 
of the mass of wages and a restrictive break in monetary policy, all this 
resulted in the second half of October in a sudden interrupting in all 
relevant generators of high inflation. That was accompanied by the 
application of nominally non inert anchors for November, what reduced 
inflationary expectations and gave an impulse to squeezing out the 
anticipative component from the structure of prices. 
 
The key role in that was played by the changes in the policy of creation 
money and the formation of its price. On the other side, owing to the 
monetary character of the inflationary processes, such a policy 
essentially contributed to the very appearance of the high inflation. This 
is in fact a source of the starting success of the antiinflationary 
measures: high inflation has been basically stopped by the interruption 
of the mechanisms of its monetary feeding. This caused the essential 
imbalances (whether inflation generated or concealed) to come to light, 
imbalances between real money, production level and foreign currency 
reserves which stopped the indexation of the key indicator of 
inflationary expectations - national currency exchange rate. 
 
To comprehend the whole question, it is necessary to keep in mind that 
at the end of the third quarter of 1992, when the inflation for the first 
time reached the level of over 28%, mutually inverse functions of the 
decrease in the stock of real money, and the growth of real dinar 
countervalue of foreign currency reserves, came to the equilibrium point 
at  the  level   of   the  one-month  social   product,  so   that  the  money 
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supply in this point was completely covered by foreign currency 
reserves and by the fund of the produced commodities and services at 
the given level of prices and exchange rate. It was technically a very 
convenient moment to undertake the measures of the antiinflationary 
policy and to avoid in such a way a part of the problems which will later 
arise. But as it was not done, it came to the accelerated opening of the 
other part of the scissors between the development of foreign currency 






As a result, at the end of September 1993, the real dinar countervalue 
of foreign currency reserves increased by 98%, while the money supply 
declined by 49%, leading to the increase in the coefficient of the 
coverage of local money by foreign currency reserves from 100 to 
363%. Simultaneously, the realized social product decreased in that 
period  by about 8%, so that such movements in the sphere of 
monetary aggregates resulted in a decrease in real money supply in 
circulation  of  44%  on  the  one  side,  and  in  the  increase  in  foreign 
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currency savings of 115% on the other. This points to the high intensity 
of the underestimation of the total money supply reducing its use only 
on current transactions. That of course significantly reduced inflationary 
taxation revenues and thereby the reallocative mobility of money. 
 
In such conditions, in mutual interaction with high inflation, a system of 
three " hard " relations between production, money supply and foreign 
currency reserves was formed, whose structural characteristics finally 
enabled a fast halt of the high inflation. 
 
The first of them refers to the increased ratio of foreign currency 
reserves and the social product, which was accompanied in the 
situation of the deficit in the trade in commodities and services with 
foreign countries, primarily on the basis of the transfer, property sales 
and foreign currency transactions with the population. The increase in 
this ratio in the conditions of production decline and high inflation, points 
out to the intensity of local capital conversion (because of opportunity 
costs) and its immobility in the banking system, from where it only 
partially and indirectly influenced through the real economic activity 
(money issue on the basis of foreign currency buying, imports credit 
financing or " financial rehabilitation " of commercial banks assets). 
 
As  the increase in the currency reserves of the central bank absorbed 
in that period 54% of the increase in total reserves, it was a basic, and 
after the abolition of selective credits, practically the only source of 
creation of base money whose quantity nominally grew at an average 
monthly rate of 23%, inducing  at a relatively stable multiplier, the 
growth of the money supply at the rate of 21 %. That represented the 
monetary basis of a high inflation, which reversely resulted in the 
decline with real quantity of money and in that manner, in forming the 
second " hard " relation  which refers to the rise in the velocity of 
money, from 1 to 1.6 times  a month. This phenomenon, normal in 
every high inflation, alleviated  the negative influence of really 
decreased liquidity on the realization of the social product, but it could 
not  completely  remove  it  because  of  the  constraints  existing  in the 
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sphere of the increase in the velocity of money. 
 
In this way, a real level of social product (Y/P) was determined as a 
sublinearly falling function of  the increasing negative difference 
between the nominal level of the money (M) and the level of prices (P): 
 
          DW = 1.7598      F = 397.2280       R2 = 0.9815       n = 21 
 
while its relative changes (y/p) were determined by the expression: 
 
 
               DW = 1.9865      F = 30.8603       R2 = 0.7491       n = 21 
 
 
That's why, a high intensity of  the creation of  money on the basis of 
the foreign currency buying, primarily influenced the inflation, while its 
impact on production was only indirect, and by intensity relatively small 
or even negative. That of course does not mean that the process of the 
increase in foreign currency reserves in the existing conditions was not 
necessary or that it did not have and still has a series of positive effects, 
nor that the creation of money on the basis of foreign currency buying 
did not enable the maintenance of a given degree of the smooth viability 
of the financial system, but the way how it was carried out brought 
about a third key imbalance in Croatian economy. 
 
This imbalance is determined by the relation between the growing real 
dinar countervalue of foreign currency reserves and the falling quantity 
of the real money, which resulted in the marginalization of the latter. 
The consequence was the actual effective introduction of foreign 
currency as the accounting unit, and of the exchange rate as the basic 
indicator of all prices in the domestic market. In this respect, however, 
because  of  the  growing  disproportion  between  the  potential  foreign 
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currency supply and demand, it was more and more difficult for the 
exchange  rate to be formed on the market basis. In fact, it was 
indexed, and its credibility was defended by the central bank as the 
largest net buyer. As a result, the effective exchange rate in the market 
varied only relatively little around it. That rate was convenient for 
exporters (especially in the context of a decreased selling on the 
domestic market), for commercial banks, and generally for all the 
owners of foreign currency, because it protected the real dinar 
countervalue of foreign currency deposits (the basic motive for savings 
in foreign currency), and stimulated the foreign currency conversion 
from the domestic " stocking ". The problem was, however, that in the 
conditions of the proinflatory character of the whole economic policy, 
the indexation was calculated " in advance ", on the basis of high 
inflationary expectations, what was transformed then into real inflation. 
The condition for  the reproduction of that mechanism was the 
continuity  of the expansive monetary policy and, consequently, the 
high inflation. 
 
It was in this way, how the circle of modalities in the functioning of the 
Croatian economy was closed before embarking on the antiinflationary 
policy measures: substitution  of  local money by foreign currency and 
its immobilization with the reflection on production decline, and all that 
with the indexed exchange rate and expansive monetary policy as the 
leading substance of that process,  and, as a consequence, a 
moderator of inflation. 
 
Therefore, it is quite logical that the initial effects of the antiinflationary 
policy implementation were first seen in the relation: foreign currency 
reserves - local money. When namely in the middle of October the 
central bank, after using  up  the foreseen quota, stopped buying 
foreign currency, their price (rate) could not be maintained on the basis 
of the nominal increase in  local money, but it was completely 
influenced by the existing absolute relation between the available 
quantities of local money and foreign currency reserves in commercial 
banks, what caused the rapid fall in the price of foreign currency. 
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There was in this, without doubt, a contribution of some speculative 
elements connected with the question of the initial credibility of the 
program, which increased the realized foreign currency offer in the 
period immediately after the initial depreciation of the national currency, 
and then, when its appreciation started, they slowed down foreign 
currency demand in the conditions of the internal convertibility. That 
significantly reduced  the dinar liquidity of commercial banks, 
influencing a further rate appreciation, in spite of the use of the 
secondary sources of liquidity which have now become expensive in 
real terms. 
 
In such a manner, the action of the exchange rate as the leading 
indicator of inflation was interrupted in a very short time, which 
contributed  to the gradual break-down of the entire previously 
described mechanism of  functioning of the economy in the conditions 
of high inflation. 
 
Simultaneously, a progressive taxation of the above the interest rate of 
6% prevented the local money price to induce from the cost side high 
inflationary expectations, i.e. to take over such role from the exchange 
rate, what could happen in the beginning of the antiinflationary 
measures in the conditions when demand for dinar on the money 
market was much higher than its supply. 
 
Such effects of the antiinflationary measures during the second half of 
October and in November, slowed down to a greater extent the 
dynamics of money flows in Croatian economy - while the heterodox 
character of these measures dispersed their effects on prices and 
incomes of all factors. The inertia of high inflation was in such a way 
transformed " overnight " in the condition of a relative nominal 
stagnation. 
 
In an analogous way, similar programmes in other countries, produced 
the first basic effect in the sphere of the rate stabilization, stopping 
thereby the process of the "dollarization of domestic prices", in the 
sense of their quotation in the expression of the given foreign currency, 
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which then converted in national currency using the rate of foreward 
indexation. This is actually taken as the basic prerequisite for the fast 
stopping of high inflation. While  during the first nine months  of 1993 
the exchange rate depreciated at an average monthly rate of 25% (with 
inflation of 27.5%), and in October - going below the upper intervention 
point of the central bank - for  a  further 12.2% , in November its value 
in the market appreciated by 9.1 %, at which level it approximately 
stayed also during December (depreciation by 2.2%). 
 
At the same time the average interest rate in the money market 
decreased from 27.4% in the period January - September, to 13.1 % in 
October, 5.2% in November, and in spite (in the meantime) of the 
abolition of the interest taxation decree, to 5.4% in December, following 
the tendency of the discount rate decrease. With one month delay, 
stabilization of money price was accompanied by a relative stabilization 
of labour price through slowing down the nominal dynamics of net 
wages from the average of 27.4% monthly in the first ten months, to 
3.5%  in November. Finally, as the lagged effect of the rate 
appreciation, the prices of petroleum products were lowered  by  4.2% 
in November and by additional 4.4% in December. In totality, that 
resulted in lowering down the inflation rate  to 1.4%  in November, and 
in the deflation of  0.5%  in December. On  the whole, producer prices 
of industrial products fell during both months:  by 4.6% in November 
and 1.5% in December. In this way, practically all relevant tasks of the 
first phase of the stabilization program were fulfilled, much faster and 
more efficiently then generally expected, with almost negligeble initial 
costs, and, what is especially important, with a very low level of 
administration, which would act contrary to the market mechanisms. 
Although namely the four initial nominal anchors representing the 
essence of the program of stopping high inflation, seemed rigorously 
restrictive, the effective course of the implementation of the whole 









In such conditions, the anchor on the exchange rate  in  the sense of 
the upper intervention point which the central bank defends by selling 
its foreign currency reserves has not been practically used. On the 
contrary, by opening the foreign exchange market and introducing 
internal convertibility of the national currency, the exchange rate in 
relation to  the upper intervention point appreciated during  the last 
three months of 1993 by 14.4%, so that in actual practice it arose a 
problem of, formally not specifyed, lower intervention point, for the 
partial defense of which the central bank purchased about 130 million 
dollars in that period. 
 
At the same time, owing to the fast stopping of inflation, the anchor on 
the discount rate and on the market interest rates (which is connected 
with the initial effects of the decree on interest taxation)  did  not result 
in their real negative values (except in a very short period in the middle 
of October) that would not correspond to the essence of  this  type of 
the antiinflationary program. Just on the contrary, while in  the 
conditions  of  high  inflation,  the  market  interest  rate  on  the average 
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hardly reached the monthly dynamics of price exchanges so that real 
income from the interest could be attained only on the basis of high 
circulation velocity, real interest rate amounted in November to 3.7% 
and in December 5.9% monthly, what on the average gives a yearly 
real interest of even 76%. 
 
It is also similar with the anchor in the sphere of net wages. 
Consequently, all three anchors, essential for breaking inflationary 
expectations, became fairly accommodating at the moment when the 
inflation was stopped. 
 
On  the other hand, anchors in the sphere of base money - first playing 
a decisive role in the rate appreciation - more and more redirected its 
function to the improvement in the banking system liquidity, and 
consequently  to  the stabilization of the exchange rate, which due to 
the intensity of imbalances in foreign currency and money markets 
resulted in a  growth  of base money  in November of even 33.4% and 
in December for 12.2%. In such a way - by the intensity not 
characteristic for the antiinflationary programmes - the real base money 
supply increased in the conditions of the interrupted inflation by fully 
48%. 
 
As the greatest part of the primary money was created by foreign 
currency transactions at an appreciating rate while the interruption of 
inflation essentially reduced the opportunity of keeping not - interest -
bearing local money, such movements primarily originated from huge 
changes in the structure of total liquid resources means (M3) of the 
national economy. While namely, on the top of the inflationary wave at 
the end of September the share of tied dinar deposits  in  the structure 
of total liquid resources amounted to 25%, by the  end  of December 
that share decreased to 14.3%, together with the stagnation of dinar 
countervalue share of foreign currency deposits (49%) which was 
caused by the appreciation of the rate. In  such  a  way, a combination 
of initially decreased current liquidity and the price change of individual 
components of total liquid resources resulted in  an increase in the 
share of money cash in their structure, from 7.5 to 13% and of current 
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deposits from 17.9 to 23.7%. All that happened in the conditions of the 
slow down of the nominal growth of those resources from the average 
of 25.7% in the first ten months to 4.6% in November and December. 
 
This phenomenon  points out to the gradual change of the gravity 
centre in the manner of action of the antiinflationary program itself; 
while in the phase of the sudden stopping of high inflation the gravity 
center lied predominantly in the absolute monetary restrictions, in the 
phase of consolidation of the initial results it moved towards the 
stabilization of relative prices. 
 
By such action, the antiinflationary program " broke " a circle which 
during 1993 reproduced the increase in the nominal deficit, generated 
by inflation and transformed the monetization of its already existing 
nominal level in new inflation. But of course such action by itself does 
not solve (but only offers the possibility of solving) the problem of the 
deficit as such and of its monetization. It can even less solve the 
problem of nonliquidity with which  a  period  of  high inflation ended -
and which in the conditions of the slowed down speed of the domestic 
money circulation and of the restricted possibility of foreign currency 
conversion - partly exists independently of the budget deficit problem. 
Therefore, until the solution of these problems does not start giving 
macroeconomically significant results, and the problems are not of the 
short-term character, it will exist a permanent pressure from the side of 
the monetization of the deficit and of the liquidity on the mechanisms 
which keep inflation on the low level. Since a foreign currency 
component prevails in these mechanisms, they are still able to resist 
these pressures for some time, but their possibilities of neutralizing the 
pressures have objective limits. The more so because the increasing 
pressures open also the question of the structure and the sources of 
foreign currency reserves. 
 
Therefore, and that is the essence of the heterodox programs and 
policies,  the low inflation level must be defended in all parts of the 
circle of generating inflationary pressures , and not only in one of its 
points. 
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In this connection, the economic policy of Croatia in 1994 must respect 
the general experiences  of  the  implementation of the heterodox type 
of the antiinflationary program, which  clearly shows that for a 
successful realization of such programs it is necessary to fullfil at least 
three social-political and economic conditions:  1)  the establishment 
and maintenance of the concensus of the dominant social and political 
structures of the society during the whole period of the program 
implementation, 2) the existence or the establishment of the 
mechanisms and instruments of economic policy necessary for the 
implementation of the program and their consistent application by 
economic policy decision-makers, and 3) resoluteness in the 
implementation of the program until an economic equilibrium has been 
established, when the generators of high inflation have been eliminated 
and the possibilities of their renewal in a short term removed. 
 
If it is not the case, it comes during the program realization to the 
reduction of the number and kinds of effectivelly used instruments, to 
the decrease in their efficiency and to the appearance of an essential 
assymetry in the degree of utilization of particular instruments, with the 
reflection on the possibility of maintaning their objective values, which 
disturbs the consistency of the program and gradually weakens its 
credibility. If the program is technically well conceived, taking into 
account that it will not be implemented in " ideal " conditions, and the 
beginning  of the implementation psychologically well chosen, the 
above problems should not represent the essential restriction in 
accomplishing primary goals in the initial phases of the program, but 
unavoidably at a later phase they become so. That's why it often 
happens, that even well initiated programs " evaporate " as the time 
passes, not achieving their integral goals - and, moreover, start 
reproducing results which are counterproductive from the aspect of 
those goals. 
 
It usually comes to that because the concensus (if established) about 
the necessity to stop the high or the hyperinflation, does not always 
mean in practice a real concensus concerning all implications for the 
functioning  of  the  national  economy  in   conditions   of   low  inflation, 
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which also includes corresponding structural changes, and the 
consequent differentiation of economic subjects which  is not equal as 
in the conditions of high inflation. It is essential therefore that economic 
policy-makers have at their disposal efficient policy instruments by 
which they will neutralize partial attempts to maintain or renew the 
economic behaviour which would again  generate  high  inflation. That 
is especially significant in the countries in transition, like Croatia, in 
which the predominant part of the economy is still in state property, 
which along with the relative underdevelopment of market institutions 
(especially in the sphere of financial markets) makes it objectively 
difficult to remove quickly the " soft " budget constraints and high 
monetization of the deficit only on the basis of the function of market 
mechanisms. 
 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of these mechanisms cannot be 
intensified in the perspective, until the inflationary taxation enables a 
high  degree  of socialization of consequences of the irrational 
economic decisions on all levels of the decision-making. Therefore, the 
current economic situation in Croatia and consequently a manner and 
level of efficiency of antiinflationary program realization have much 
broader dimensions than the technical stopping of high inflation. They 
will in the final  analysis influence the speed of the transitional 
processes and of the establishment of firm material and financial bases 
of a new revival of economic activity. 
 
